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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 16-4082
___________
DWIGHT L. DAVIS,
Impropria Persona,
Appellant
v.
VICE CHANCELLOR JOHN W. NOBLE, Delaware Chancery
Court; MICHAEL P. MIGLIORE, Wilmington UDAG
Corporation; SAMUEL L. GUY LAW; FERRY JOSEPH
PEARCE; MAYOR DENNIS P. WILLIAMS; MATHEW LITNER
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-16-cv-00044)
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 2, 2017
Before: SHWARTZ, COWEN and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 3, 2017)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Dwight L. Davis appeals from the order of the District Court declining to
reconsider the dismissal of his amended complaint. We will affirm.
I.
Davis’s claims are based largely on previous litigation before the Delaware Court
of Chancery. By way of publicly available background, Davis was a plaintiff in a suit
seeking a declaration that he and others were proper members of the Board of Directors
of the West Center City Neighborhood Planning Advisory Committee, Inc. (the
“Committee”). In particular, Davis challenged application of an amendment to a
Committee bylaw that would have served to strip him of that position.
In 2002, the Delaware court granted partial summary judgment in Davis’s favor
and invalidated the bylaw. See W. Ctr. City Neighborhood Ass’n, Inc. v. W. Ctr. City
Neighborhood Planning Advisory Comm., Inc., No. Civ. A. 19557-NC, 2002 WL
1403322, at *3 (Dec. Ch. June 20, 2002). In doing so, the court directed the parties’
counsel to “confer and submit an implementing form of order within ten days.” Id.
It is not clear whether counsel ever did so. In 2003, however, the Delaware court entered
its final judgment declaring that Davis was a proper member of the Board. See W. Ctr.
City Neighborhood Ass’n, Inc. v. W. Ctr. City Neighborhood Planning Advisory Comm.,
Inc., No. Civ. A. 19557-NC, 2003 WL 241356, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2003).
Over thirteen years later, Davis filed and then amended the complaint at issue
here. Davis invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and named several defendants, including the
chancellor who presided over the Delaware litigation and lawyers who were involved in
that litigation. Davis did not assert any specific cause of action, and his amended
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complaint is largely devoid of factual allegations. Davis alleged that an organization
(apparently the Committee) “goes dark” following the 2003 order and then “resurfaces”
in 2004 with an apparently different Board. (ECF No. 4 at 6.) Davis next alleged that he
learned in 2011 that this “unlawfully constituted group” had been “plundering and looting
resources meant to be spent on West Center City residents.” (Id.) Davis’s only request
for relief was for the District Court to issue a “writ of mandamus” to compel the
Delaware court to enforce its 2002 and 2003 orders and enter a “final judgment” that
could be given full faith and credit. (Id. at 7.) He also requested that the District Court
“assess damage as a result of the Court[’]s failure” to do so. (Id.)
The defendants filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint on numerous
grounds, including the statute of limitations. Davis then filed a motion for leave to
further amend his complaint by adding two defendants, but he did not raise any additional
factual allegations. By order entered August 24, 2016, the District Court granted
defendants’ motions, dismissed Davis’s amended complaint, and denied as futile his
motion for leave to further amend.
In doing so, the District Court concluded that any § 1983 claims were untimely
under the two-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims arising in Delaware,
see McDowell v. Del. State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 1996), because Davis
pleaded on the face of his complaint that he learned of defendants’ alleged “plundering”
in 2011, some five years before he filed suit. The District Court also noted that any
potential § 1983 claims were subject to dismissal on other grounds, including that the
Delaware court chancellor was entitled to absolute judicial immunity and that certain
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defendants were not state actors for § 1983 purposes. Finally, the District Court declined
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to the extent that Davis’s amended complaint
pleaded any state-law claims. In that regard, the District Court noted that it did not have
jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus directed to a Delaware state court. Davis then
filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to disqualify the District Judge. The
District Court denied those motions by order entered November 4, 2016. Davis appeals. 1
II.
We will affirm largely for the reasons explained by the District Court. Davis does
not raise any meaningful challenge to the District Court’s rulings on appeal, but he does
raise four points that we will briefly address.
First, Davis takes issue with the District Court’s application of the statute of
limitations. Davis asserts in his opening brief that § 1983 “has no federal statute of
limitations.” As noted above, however, Davis’s § 1983 claims are governed by a twoyear statute of limitations. The District Court properly applied that statute of limitations
because the defense was apparent on the face of Davis’s complaint. See Stephens v.
Clash, 796 F.3d 281, 288 (3d Cir. 2015). Davis did not provide any potential basis for
tolling in the District Court, including in his motion for leave to further amend, and he
has provided no such basis even on appeal. Davis asserts without explanation that state
statutes of limitations “toll based on pendency or lack of final judgment.” Whatever
1

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We construe the District Court as having
dismissed Davis’s amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and we exercise
plenary review over that ruling. See Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220
(3d Cir. 2011). We review the denial of reconsideration and leave to amend for abuse of
discretion, but we review underlying legal determinations de novo. See id.
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Davis may be intending to argue in this regard, the Delaware court entered its final
judgment in 2003. Davis also asserts in his reply brief that “fraud has no statute of
limitations,” which may be an attempt to invoke the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.
Even if we were to consider this bare assertion made for the first time in reply, however,
it remains apparent that Davis was aware of all of his alleged injuries at least by 2011.
Second, Davis faults the District Court for relying on a “habeas corpus case” in
determining that it lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to a state court. The
District Court relied for that proposition on In re Wolenski, 324 F.2d 309, 309 (3d Cir.
1963) (per curiam), in which we held that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to issue a
writ of mandamus directed to a state court. Wolenski was not a habeas case and, even it
were, that circumstance would not undermine application of its holding in other contexts.
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Wright II), 654 F.2d 268, 278 & n.19 (3d Cir. 1981)
(collecting cases for the proposition that federal courts “ordinarily may not issue a writ of
mandamus to compel a state court to exercise a jurisdiction entrusted to it”).
Third, Davis asserts that the District Court “offer[ed] no case citations . . . for
declining original jurisdiction.” Davis presumably is referring to the District Court’s
decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The District Court did cite authority in
support of that decision, and that decision was well within its discretion. See 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c); De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 309 (3d Cir. 2003).
Finally, Davis asserts that the District Court erred because it “accepted and
adopted the defendants[’] pleadings in their entirety verbatim.” The District Court,
however, issued its own opinion in its own words.
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These points aside, Davis does not take issue with any of the District Court’s
alternative rulings or with its denial of reconsideration or disqualification. Thus, as the
participating defendants argue, Davis has waived any potential arguments in those
regards. Nevertheless, we have reviewed the record and perceive no error in these rulings
for the reasons that the District Court explained.
III.
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. Davis’s
motion to strike appellee Matthew Lintner’s letter docketed on January 13, 2017, is
denied. We note that the letter did not raise any arguments not already raised by other
appellees and that it is not necessary to our disposition.
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